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Hazard, Jr. Geoffrey
Justice Marshall in the Medium of Civil
Procedure: Portrait of a Master
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.*
As the former counsel to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the first
African American on the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Marshall is widely
considered a protector of civil rights and civil liberties. While this perception
of Justice Marshall is well deserved and substantiated by his record,' it may
obscure his mastery of ordinary justice as expressed in the law of civil
procedure.
The law of procedure was a medium of Justice Marshall's art in the law, as
much as his conversance with free speech and equal rights. Many of his
decisions dealt with these internal rules by which the court system performs
its functions-"lawyer's law." Although issues of procedural law are rela-
tively neutral in ideological and policy implications, they pose fundamental
complexities and dilemmas of the system of justice itself. Procedure is the
law's ordinary essence. How the law goes to work every day at the court-
house constitutes as much of the law's task in the social order as do great
cases such as Brown v. Board of Education.2 Justice Marshall was in this
sense a master of the ordinary.
This commentary develops that point by demonstration and through com-
ment about five cases: Marshall's resolution of a conflict between issue pre-
clusion and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in Lytle v.
Household Manufacturing, Inc.;3 his interpretation of the power of federal
courts to remand state law claims to state courts in Carnegie-Mellon Univer-
* Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University; Director, American Law Institute.
1. In the field of civil rights, see, e.g., California Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272
(1987) (Pregnancy Discrimination Act sets floor, not ceiling, on pregnancy disability benefits); City
of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (preclearance provisions of Voting Rights Act consti-
tutional); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference to prisoner's serious medical
needs may violate Eighth Amendment, thus actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
In the field of constitutional law, see, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221 (1987) (state sales tax scheme taxing general interest publications and exempting specialty pub-
lications violates First Amendment); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (state requirement of
citizenship for position of notary public violates Equal Protection Clause); Bolger v. Young Drug
Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (absolute ban on mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contra-
ceptives violates First Amendment); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (city
ordinance distinguishing between peaceful picketing and peaceful labor picketing violates Equal
Protection Clause); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (state obscenity stautute punishing
mere private possession of obscene material violates First Amendment).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. 494 U.S. 545 (1990).
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stiy v. Cohill;4 the tensions between statutory and common-law forum non
conveniens in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno;5 his maneuvering in Walker v.
A rmco Steel Corp. 6 to accomodate the recurring Erie choice of law issues in
the face of conflicting precedent; and his use of "admonitory" appellate re-
view in Kerr v. United States District Court.7 Lastly, I provide further reflec-
tions on Justice Marshall's contributions to the field of civil procedure.
I. L YTLE V. HOUSEHOLD MANUFACTURING, INC
Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc.8 was decided toward the end of
Justice Marshall's distinguished career on the Supreme Court. At issue was
a conflict between the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel. The case involved a suit by a discharged em-
ployee, an "Afro-American" as Justice Marshall described him,9 based on
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 and § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866,11 also referred to as § 1981. The essential allegation under both counts
was that the plaintiff had been fired because of his race. 12 By settled law
plaintiff had a right to a jury trial on the § 1981 count;13 however, the law
was unsettled as to whether a similar right existed under Title VII.1 4 The
trial judge had dismissed the § 1981 count as a matter of law and then heard
the Title VII claim without a jury, making findings of facts adverse to plain-
tiff. 5 The court of appeals held that the dismissal of the § 1981 count was
erroneous, but nevertheless affirmed the trial court's judgment on collateral
estoppel grounds. 16 It held that the trial judge's previous adverse factual
determinations in the Title VII count were issue preclusive against the plain-
tiff in the § 1981 count.1 7 Plaintiff contended that those determinations
should not be preclusive, arguing that the right to jury trial on those issues
should not be foreclosed where the determination by the judge was predi-
cated on an erroneous dismissal of the jury-triable § 1981 claim. 18
4. 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
5. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
6. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
7. 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
8. 494 U.S. 545 (1990).
9. Id. at 547.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h (1982).
II. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
12. 494 U.S. at 547-48.
13. Id. at 550.
14. Id. at 549 n.1. The Supreme Court assumed for purposes of the opinion that plaintiffs seek-
ing relief under Title VII did not have the right to a jury trial, but declined to rule on this issue. Id.
15. Id. at 549.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
2064 [V/ol. 80:2063
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An understanding of the problem required consideration of two interre-
lated counts, two possible outcomes in the fact issues, two modes of finding
the facts, and, as it turned out, a dissonance between two lines of precedent.
One line of precedent, emanating from Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 19
established that in cases of uncertainty, a jury trial should be the mode of fact
determination, even though doing so would require restructuring the conven-
tional order of the trial. The other line of precedent, emanating from Park-
lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,20 established that the findings of a judge sitting
without a jury are preclusive through collateral estoppel when the same is-
sues are presented in a later adjudication.
The ease and directness of Justice Marshall's treatment of the problem is a
fair indication of his command of its technical intricacy. From his opinion
one gets the distinct sense that the man knows this branch of law. Moreover,
the impression is that he knows the law not only as a Supreme Court Justice
but as one who has "done" law-indeed, encountered this very kind of prob-
lem-from less lofty perspectives. He is intimately familiar with the proce-
dural forms, and recognizes that these different procedural forms will
themselves have substantive impact on the disposition of the claims of civil
rights plaintiffs.
Justice Marshall put the question to be decided in Lytle in the form of the
adversarial contentions by the parties. He first summarized the plaintiff's
contention, which his opinion for the Court thereafter sustains. However,
before proceeding with the Court's analysis and conclusion, Justice Marshall
stated the defendant's opposite contention:
[Defendant] argues that this case is governed by Parklane Hosiery Co.,
rather than by Beacon Theatres, because the District Court made its find-
ings when no legal claims [triable by jury] were pending before it. In [de-
fendant's] view, if an appellate court finds that a trial court's dismissal of
legal claims was erroneous and remands the legal claims to the trial court,
that case would in effect constitute a separate action and therefore be sub-
ject to collateral estoppel under Parklane Hosiery CO. 21
This classic way of framing an issue as the adversaries' statements gave the
defendant's contention full credit. Moreover, giving full credit to both par-
ties' contentions also demonstrated concern for the interests of the losing
party. Justice Marshall, when he wrote his opinion, well knew that the de-
fendant was to be the loser.
Justice Marshall's resolution of the conflict rested both upon technical and
policy considerations. As a technical matter: "Application of collateral es-
19. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
20. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
21. Lytle, 494 U.S. at 551.
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toppel is unnecessary here to prevent multiple lawsuits because this case in-
volves one suit in which the plaintiff properly joined his legal and equitable
claims."' 22 As a matter of policy: "[C]oncern about judicial economy, to the
extent that it supports [defendant's] position, remains an insufficient basis for
departing from our longstanding commitment to preserving a litigant's right
to a jury trial."'23
Concern both for technical precision and larger policy considerations is
typical of Justice Marshall's opinions. Law without technical precision is
shapeless and leaves those who would follow the law without guidance as to
its limits. Law without policy is vacuous and leaves those who would follow
the law without a sense of direction.
II. CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY V. COHILL
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill24 was another employment discrimi-
nation case involving multiple claims. This time the multiplicity of claims
led to the issue of the federal courts' power to remand cases to state courts.
The plaintiffs alleged a single federal claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 196725 and alternative theories based on state law, all
arising from one of the plaintiffs' discharge. 26 The suit had initially been
brought in state court, but the defendants removed it to the district court on
the basis of the federal claim. The state claims came along under pendent
jurisdiction. 27 The plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed the federal age dis-
crimination claim, leaving only state claims, and sought to remand the case
to state court.28 Defendants resisted, arguing that the district court had only
two alternatives: Retain the case notwithstanding the termination of the fed-
eral claim, or dismiss the action, leaving the plaintiffs to refile in state court,
which could result in foreclosure of the opportunity to litigate if the statute
of limitations had expired. 29
Plaintiffs contended that there was a third option: Remand the case to
state court.30 Aside from being mechanically simple, remanding the case
would mean that the statute of limitations period would be calculated from
the initial commencement of the action in state court.
Sensible as the plaintiffs' suggestion might appear, there was a serious ob-
22. Id. at 553.
23. Id. at 553-54.
24. 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
26. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 345-46.
27. Id. at 346.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 351-52.
30. Id. at 346.
2066 [Vol. 80:2063
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stacle. No provision in the Judicial Code31 authorized such a remand. As
recognized in the lower courts, "[T]wo sections of the [Judicial Code] au-
thorize district courts to remand after removal .... [However,] § 1447 did
not apply because the removal was jurisdictionally proper and ... § 1441(c)
did not apply because the remaining state-law claims ... were pendent to,
rather than separate and independent of, the federal-law claim .... "32
Moreover, an additional obstacle had been erected by Justice Marshall
himself in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer33, in which he stated
that a case should not be remanded without express authorization in the fed-
eral removal statute: "[W]e are not convinced that Congress ever intended
to extend carte blanche authority to the district courts to revise the federal
statutes governing removal by remanding cases on grounds that seem justifi-
able to them but which are not recognized by the controlling statute."
34
In the face of such silence in the statutes and such dictum by the Court
itself, the defendants were in a strong position to argue, as they did, that the
district court did not have the authority to remand a properly removed fed-
eral claim case because the predicate federal claim had been dropped. 35 Con-
cerning this argument, Justice Marshall came as close to a direct concession
as one could reasonably expect from a sitting Justice: "As [defendants] point
out, this Court's opinion in Thermtron... contains some language that could
be read to support the opposite conclusion [that federal courts have only
power to remand as authorized by federal statute.]" '36
How then to resolve the problem? Justice Marshall had already conceded
that the defendants had a rather good argument in technical terms, with part
of those terms supplied by the Justice himself. Yet there were very serious
practical consequences to treating the silence of the remand statute as pre-
empting authority to remand under circumstances not specified in the stat-
ute. The immediate consequence of holding remand to be unauthorized was
quite clear: plaintiffs would be time-barred from asserting their state-law
claims if the statute of limitations expired while the federal court still had
jurisdiction over the case. 37
Foreclosure of the possibility of remand could also have third-order conse-
quences in the effect on strategy by plaintiffs' lawyers contemplating asser-
tion of federal claims in state courts:
Moreover, if a plaintiff bringing suit in state court knows that, notwith-
31. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-45 (1988).
32. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 346-47.
33. 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
34. Id. at 351.
35. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 353.
36. Id. at 355 (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 351-52.
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standing the expiration of a statute of limitations, a federal court to which a
case is removed must dismiss the case upon deciding that exercise of pen-
dent jurisdiction would be inappropriate, the plaintiff may well decline to
allege any federal-law claims .... Thus, [such] a rule ... would ... chill
other plaintiffs from bringing their federal-law claims.38
Having regard for these consequences, Justice Marshall juxtaposed against
the Thermtron negation a more general premise drawn from the very concept
of pendent jurisdiction set forth in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs:39
Gibbs establishes that the pendent jurisdiction doctrine is designed to
enable courts to handle cases involving state-law claims in the way that will
best accommodate the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and com-
ity, and Gibbs further establishes that the Judicial Branch is to shape and
apply the doctrine in that light. 4°
Justice Marshall's formulation of Gibbs is broader than the text of that
decision. To this extent, Justice Marshall makes a bootstrap out of Gibbs. If
Gibbs was as broad as his statement suggests, then a federal district court, if
it had jurisdiction over any claim in a transaction, could also assert pendent
jurisdiction over every claim in the transaction. 4 1 That would be going too
far, or at least much further than the precedents. However, it must also be
noted, as Justice Marshall well knew, that the concept of pendent jurisdiction
is itself a bootstrap, the product of judicial invention with a complex history
long antedating the Gibbs decision. 42
The point for present purposes, however, is that Justice Marshall sought
out a precedent that would have three-fold significance. First, it would em-
brace the pragmatic considerations to which he had drawn attention about
the preclusive effect of dismissing, rather than remanding, when there is an
expired statute of limitations. Second, it would neutralize the proposition
unguardedly asserted in Thermtron that the federal courts have only such
jurisdictional powers of remand as are conferred by statute. And, third, it
would call attention to the fact that the problem posed in Cohill-what to do
with state-law claims in a federal question case when the federal question is
38. Id. at 352 n.9.
39. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
40. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 351.
41. This, of course, is not the law. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806)
(complete diversity of citizenship necessary to obtain federal jurisdiction over state law claims).
Compare Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (federal court not au-
thorized to hear nonfederal claim based solely on finding that federal and nonfederal claims arose
from common nucleus of operative facts) with 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1991 Supp.) (district court author-
ized to exercise jurisdiction over civil actions only where amount in controversy exceeds $50,000
and diversity of citizenship present).
42. See Hum v. Ousler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933) (federal courts have power to decide certain state
law claims in cases involving federal questions). Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1991 Supp.), adopted in
1991.
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no longer involved-was a derivative of pendent jurisdiction, which in turn is
a creature of law made by the courts themselves and not by Congress. Of
course, that left the Thermtron dictum in lonely isolation. But that is where
it should have been left.
III. PIPER AIRCRAFT Co. v. REYNO
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno 43 presented another complicated situation cre-
ated by procedural maneuver and counter-maneuver. The efforts of foreign
plaintiffs to obtain a forum in the United States because of its more favorable
liability laws suggested a conflict between the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens and the federal change of venue statute. An American-made light
commercial plane manufactured by Piper Aircraft Co. had crashed in Scot-
land while on a charter flight, killing all aboard.44 The decedents were Scot-
tish, and their survivors brought an action for damages in the United
Kingdom.45 They also brought parallel wrongful death actions in California
state court.46 The defendants-the manufacturer of the plane (Piper Aircraft
Co., located in Pennsylvania) and the manufacturer of its propellers (Hart-
zell Propellers, Inc., located in Ohio)-removed the case to federal court in
California.47 Upon removal, defendants sought transfer of the case to Penn-
sylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which provides for transfer from one
federal district court to another "[flor the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest of justice. ' '48 That motion was granted.
When the case had been lodged in the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
defendants moved to dismiss the action on the ground of forum non con-
veniens-the doctrine that a court which regards itself as a manifestly inap-
propriate forum may decline to exercise jurisdiction.49 The district court
dismissed after finding that both the private interests of the litigants and the
public interests of the forum made exercise of jurisdiction inappropriate.50
The Third Circuit then reversed the dismissal, analogizing forum non con-
veniens to a statutory transfer, which would prohibit dismissal if it would
lead to a change in the applicable law adverse to the plaintiff.5 1
Justice Marshall's opinion first carefully explained this background, all in
43. 454 U.S. 235 (1982).
44. Id. at 238-39.
45. Id. at 240.
46. Id. at 239-40. The state court actions followed the appointment by the California probate
court of a local administratrix, as it happened, a secretary in the law office of the plaintiff's attorney.
Id. at 239.
47. Id. at 240.
48. Id. at 240 & n.4.
49. Id. at 243-44.
50. Id. at 241-44.
51. Id. at 245-46.
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greater detail than set forth above. In summarizing the work of the courts
below, Justice Marshall recounted that the trial court had relied principally
on Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 52 the Supreme Court's leading decision articulat-
ing the forum non conveniens doctrine. In contrast, the court of appeals had
relied primarily on decisions applying § 1404(a), enacted by Congress shortly
after the Gilbert decision and commonly known as "statutory forum non
conveniens." Decisions under § 1404(a), particularly Van Dusen v. Bar-
rack, 53 had held that, upon a § 1404(a) transfer, the transferee court should
apply the law of the transferor court, thus protecting whatever choice of law
advantage the plaintiff had established in the original forum.54
The plaintiff's argument in Piper was that forum non conveniens in mul-
tinational litigation should be administered with the same deference to plain-
tiff's choice of law advantage as under the statutory forum non conveniens
provision in § 1404(a).55 As Justice Marshall noted, "[the plaintiff] candidly
admits that the action against Piper and Hartzell was filed in the United
States because its laws regarding liability, capacity to sue, and damages are
more favorable to her position than are those of Scotland."' 56 Since it was
certain that the courts of the United Kingdom would not apply American
products liability law and damages rules, let alone use American jury proce-
dure, dismissal of the action in this country would relegate the plaintiff to a
radically less favorable forum.
One way of stating the question is whether the decisional law formulation
of forum non conveniens, epitomized in Gilbert, should be displaced by the
statutory-interpretive formulation in Van Dusen. As Justice Marshall ex-
plained, if reference was made primarily to Gilbert, then choice of law conse-
quences would not be determinative. 57 Although Gilbert stated that a
plaintiff's choice of forum should not easily be disturbed, it emphasized the
district court's discretion to dismiss when the chosen forum is oppressive to
the defendant and inconvenient and cumbersome for the court. 58 Justice
Marshall additionally pointed out that the antecedent of Gilbert, Canada
Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd.,59 expressly declined to consider
adverse choice of law consequences to the plaintiff in a dismissal based on
forum non conveniens.6o
Justice Marshall then addressed the impact of the relevant line of cases on
52. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
53. 376 U.S. 612 (1956).
54. Id. at 622.
55. Piper, 454 U.S. at 240.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 249.
58. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
59. 285 U.S. 413 (1932).
60. Piper, 454 U.S. at 247-48.
2070 [Vol. 80:2063
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the doctrine of forum non conveniens: "Gilbert in no way affects the validity
of Canada Malting. Indeed, by holding that the central focus of the forum
non conveniens inquiry is convenience, Gilbert implicitly recognized that dis-
missal may not be barred solely because of the possibility of an unfavorable
change in law." '61
As for Van Dusen v. Barrack, Justice Marshall found it inapplicable to
forum non conveniens dismissals: "That case ... focused on 'the construc-
tion and application' of § 1404(a).... [Van Dusen] concluded that Congress
could not have intended a transfer to be accompanied by a change in law
.... The statute was designed as a 'federal housekeeping measure,' allowing
easy change of venue within a unified federal system." 62
Having thus established the proper formulation of the common-law forum
non conveniens doctrine, and distinguished it from the statutory version, Jus-
tice Marshall then held that "[t]he forum non conveniens determination is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court."' 63 Accordingly, the
standard of review on appeal is abuse of discretion, one very deferential to
the trial court. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens as stated in
Piper, the only factors the trial court must consider are the public and private
interests, which look to the convenience of the forum and the litigants.
64
While this formulization of the forum non conveniens doctrine resolved
the controversy at hand, some aspects of Van Dusen were left unresolved.
The Justice said nothing about the factors of fairness that the Court had
invoked in Van Dusen to justify its rule that there should be no change in
governing law following a statutory change of venue. Such silence could be
taken as implicit criticism of Van Dusen. However, if such criticism was
intended, it remained unvoiced. Also unvoiced was criticism of the serious
legal anomalies that Van Dusen had ignored in arriving at its result. 65 How-
ever considerations of fairness might be weighed between civil litigants in
61. Id. at 248-49 (footnote omitted).
62. Id. at 253-54 (citations and footnote omitted).
63. Id. at 257.
64. Id.
65. The most serious technical anomaly in Van Dusen concerned the legal status of the plaintiff
in that case. Van Dusen, like Piper, involved a suit by the appointed personal representative of a
decedent. Under prevailing doctrine, such a legal personality has existence only within the state in
which it was created. The personal representative in Van Dusen was constituted in Pennsylvania,
and hence, properly speaking, could not have existence in Massachusetts, the location of the district
to which the defendants in Van Dusen had sought the § 1404(a) transfer. On that basis, no
§ 1404(a) transfer would have been legally possible, which of course is one of the considerations the
plaintiff in Van Dusen had in mind. The Court in Van Dusen simply chopped through that Gordian
knot. But the ultimate price of ignoring this kind of problem was subsequently paid in Ferens v.
John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990), where the plaintiff brought suit for a Pennsylvania-sited injury
in Mississippi to obtain a more favorable Mississippi statute of limitations and then transferred
under § 1441(a) to Pennsylvania federal district court because that was where all the parties, wit-
nesses and evidence were located. Some "housekeeping."
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different American courts, they weigh differently when the choice of forum
would result in radically different choice of law consequences: "The Ameri-
can courts, which are already extremely attractive to foreign plaintiffs, would
become even more attractive."'66
One may infer that Justice Marshall, at least in this context, had accepted
the sad wisdom that not all of the law's internal contradictions can be re-
solved, certainly not in one day's work.
IV. WALKER V. ARMCO STEEL CORPORATION
An even better example of leaving legal contradictions unresolved is re-
vealed in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,67 which presented a recurring varia-
tion of the Erie problem. 68 Plaintiff brought a products liability action based
on state law in the United States District Court in Oklahoma. 69 The action
was filed within the two-year period specified in the applicable Oklahoma
statute of limitations. Process was not served, however, until after the two-
year period had run.70 Under the Oklahoma limitations statute "[a]n action
shall be deemed commenced . . . as to each defendant, at the date of the
summons which is served on him."'71 On that basis, the action was barred.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, however, provides that an action is "com-
menced" by filing the complaint. 72 The 1938 Advisory Committee Note con-
cerning this provision's significance with respect to statutes of limitations was
guardedly ambiguous. 73 It is a fair interpretation, however, that Rule 3 was
intended to determine the running of a state statute of limitations if doing so
could fairly be regarded as a matter of "practice and procedure" within the
66. Piper, 454 U.S. at 251 (footnote omitted). Within this statement is a long footnote explaining
why U.S. forums are so attractive to foreign plaintiffs:
First, all but 6 of the 50 American States ... offer strict liability .... Second, the tort
plaintiff may choose, at least potentially, from among 50 jurisdictions .... Each ...
applies its own malleable choice-of-law rules. Third, jury trials are almost always avail-
able in the United States, while they are never provided in civil law jurisdictions....
Fourth,... American courts allow contingent attorneys' fees, and do not tax losing par-
ties with their opponents' attorney's fees .... Fifth, discovery is more extensive in Ameri-
can than in foreign courts.
Id. at 252 n. 18 (citations omitted).
67. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
68. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), established that federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction are to apply federal law to procedural issues, but must apply state law to substantive
state-created rights, "except in matters governed by the federal Constitution or Acts of Congress."
Id. at 78.
69. Walker. 446 U.S. at 742.
70. Id.
71. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 97 (1971), quoted in Walker, 446 U.S. at 743 n.4.
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 3, Advisory Committee's Note.
[Vol. 80:20632072
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meaning of the Rules Enabling Act,74 and if the Enabling Act, as so con-
strued, was a valid exercise of federal authority. 75 On that analysis the action
was not barred. The question, therefore, was whether the plaintiff's action
should be dismissed on the basis of the state statute or permitted to proceed
on the basis of Rule 3.
As is well known to those familiar with the Erie doctrine, essentially the
same question had arisen in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co. 76
years before. The state statute of limitations involved in Ragan had the same
terms as that involved in Walker, and Rule 3 provided the same text and
legislative history. Ragan had been decided under the tutelage of Guaranty
Trust Co. of New York v. York,77 an early and salient rationale for the Erie
doctrine. In York the Court had pronounced the extravagant premise that:
[T]he intent of [the Erie] decision was to insure that, in all cases where a
federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citi-
zenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court
should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the out-
come of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.78
Indeed, in York the Court went even further and posited that in adjudicat-
ing a state-created right in a diversity case, a federal district court is "in
effect, only another court of the state."' 79 On these premises, the Court in
Ragan held that the state provision governed, requiring that service, as well
as filing, be made within the limitation period in order to toll the statute.
Given the premise, the result in Ragan was inevitable.
After Ragan, however, the Court had been confronted with a case that
presented greater difficulty in giving effect to York's broad premises. Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative80 presented another conflict between
state and federal rules. In that case, the applicable state rule would have
required that a critical issue going to the merits be decided by the judge
sitting without a jury. If standard federal procedure was followed, the Sev-
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2702 (1988).
75. The Advisory Committee's Note states:
When a Federal or State statute of limitations is pleaded as a defense, a question may arise
... whether the mere filing of the complaint stops the running of the statute .... The
answer to this question may depend on whether it is competent for the Supreme Court,
exercising the power to make rules of procedure without affecting substantive rights, to
vary the operation of statutes of limitation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 3, Advisory Committee's Note, quoted in Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.10. The
Advisory Committee thus was also mindful of the usefulness of postponing the resolution of
uncertainties.
76. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
77. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
78. Id. at 109.
79. Id. at 108.
80. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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enth Amendment would require that the issue be submitted to the jury. The
Court had previously indicated in its Erie jurisprudence that the right to jury
trial was an "outcome determinative" rule.81 On that basis, the state rule
should have been followed in the situation presented in Byrd. However, this
would have put the Court in the interesting position of holding that the Sev-
enth Amendment was inconsistent with the constitutional limitations to
which a federal court was subject, under the premise that a federal court in
diversity is "only another court of the state." That is, if Erie implied that
federal courts in a diversity case act as state courts, as stated in York, then
giving effect to the Seventh Amendment in a diversity case would be
unconstitutional.
In Byrd the Court recoiled from this absurdity, holding that the federal
rule calling for jury trial should govern, even if it might yield a different
"outcome." However, in reaching this result the Court, speaking through
Justice Brennan, took occasion to express a premise hardly less extravagant
than those stated in York. Whereas York had said that a federal court sitting
in diversity is "only another court of the state," the Byrd majority stated:
"The federal system is an independent system for administering justice
....,,2 This premise, if taken at face value, would overrule Erie. Indeed, it
would cast some doubt on the constitutionality of the Rules of Decision Act
itself, which requires that "the laws of the several states shall be the rules of
decision" in various situations.8 3
Be that as it may, some years later, in Hanna v. Plumer, 84 the Court tried
to make sense of these incompatible pronouncements and their divergent re-
sults. In that case the Court confronted a slight variation on the Ragan
problem. A state statute governed the time within which the action had to be
brought and specified the crucial event as service "in hand" of process on the
defendant.8 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 provided that service of pro-
cess could be effected by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the
defendant's abode.8 6 If state procedure governed, the action was too late. If
the Federal Rules governed-and if service effected under Rule 4 tolled the
statute of limitations-the action was not too late. The Court held that the
action was not too late.8 7
Those familiar with the field have recollections of the rationale the Court
offered in Hanna. However, it is interesting to recall Hanna through the
description provided by Justice Marshall in his opinion fcr the Court in the
81. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956).
82. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
84. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
85. Id. at 462.
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
87. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.
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subsequent Walker case. Walker involved the same issue as Ragan, which
rested on the premise that a federal court sitting in diversity was "only an-
other court of the state." That premise had been succeeded in Byrd by the
premise that the federal courts were "an independent system of administer-
ing justice," and Hanna indicated that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
displaced state law in matters fairly within the terms of the Rules. Thus, if
Hanna terms were to be taken literally, Ragan had been overruled.
Justice Marshall's account of the Court's decision in Hanna is deadpan:
We stated [in Hanna] that the "outcome-determination" test of Erie and
York had to be read with reference to the "twin aims" of Erie: "discour-
agement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of
the laws . . . ." We determined that the choice between the state in-hand
service rule and the Federal Rule "would be of scant, if any, relevance to
the choice of a forum" ....
The Court explained that where the Federal Rule was clearly applicable,
as in Hanna, the test was whether the Rule was within the scope of the
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, and if so, within a constitutional
grant of power such as the Necessary and Proper Clause of Art. J.88
This is a fair description of Hanna. Anyone who understands Hanna at
this level of abstraction is to be congratulated. However, at the level of grand
procedural theory, Hanna had not undertaken to reconcile the premise in
York that the federal court in diversity was "only another court of the state"
with that in Byrd that the federal courts were an "independent system of
administering justice." Further, at the level of mere procedural technicality,
Hanna had not explained why the provision for service of process in Federal
Rule 4 "trumped" the state rule governing commencement of an action for
purposes of the statute of limitations, but the provision for commencing an
action in Federal Rule 3 did not.
Justice Marshall refrained from further adventure. He made a gesture to-
ward rationalization at the technical level, but none above that. In holding
that the Oklahoma statute of limitations' provisions trumped Federal Rule 3,
his ratio decidendi, as it used to be called, was indeed quite simple, based in
essence on stare decisis:
The present case is indistinguishable from Ragan .... [T]he doctrine of
stare decisis weighs heavily against petitioner .... Stare decisis does not
mandate that earlier decisions be enshrined forever, of course, but it does
counsel that we use caution in rejecting established law .... A litigant
who in effect asks us to reconsider not one but two prior decisions bears a
heavy burden of supporting such a change in our jurisprudence. Petitioner
88. Walker, 446 U.S. at 747-48 (citations omitted).
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here has not met that burden.8 9
That is, Ragan is consistent with Hanna because we say it is. And then
the Justice adds a perfectly wonderful footnote, putting aside the issue of
Rule 3's effect as a tolling provision on statutes of limitations applied to fed-
eral law claims: "We do not here address the role of Rule 3 as a tolling
provision for a statute of limitations, whether set by federal law or borrowed
from state law, if the cause of action is based on federal law." 9
This footnote is food for a long mental trip in the law of procedure: if
Rule 3 can toll a statute of limitations that otherwise would run according to
state law, then Rule 3 must to that extent displace state law in the scheme
called for by the Rules of Decision Act. If Rule 3 displaces state law to the
extent of tolling a claim based on federal law, it must be that Rule 3 is a valid
implementation of the Rules Enabling Act. By the same token, the Rules
Enabling Act to that extent must displace the Rules of Decision Act in ac-
tions involving federal claims. Furthermore, to that extent Rule 3 must be
valid under the Constitution. But if Rule 3 is valid to this extent, why is it
not equally valid in the context of a claim based on state law? That is, if Rule
3 is not equally valid in the context of a claim based on state law, does this
mean that the Enabling Act has an undisclosed set of internal restrictions,
under which some of the rules to be adopted will be applicable in diversity
cases but others will not? If Rule 3 does not have equal effect in the context
of diversity cases as it has in federal question cases, does this mean that the
"judicial power" established in Article III is of lesser scope and stature in
diversity cases than it is in federal question cases and admiralty? Does it also
imply that Congress has less authority under the Necessary and Proper
Clause of Article I when it addresses the administration of justice in diversity
jurisdiction than when it addresses federal question jurisdiction?
Justice Marshall's footnote prudently left these questions for another day.
Perhaps they have to be left forever.
V. KERR V. UNITED STA TES DISTRICT COURT
Kerr v. United States District Court9' is not very well known compared
with other procedural decisions by Justice Marshall. The opinion is intrigu-
ing, however, in that it can be read as legitimating an additional basis of
appellate review by augmenting that available in appeals from final judg-
ments, appeals from interlocutory orders, and appellate review by extraordi-
nary writ such as mandamus and prohibition. 92 The review exercised by the
89. Id. at 748-49.
90. Id. at 751 n.l1.
91. 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
92. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (1988) (certiorari for review by Supreme Court); 28 U.S.C.
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Supreme Court in Kerr might be called admonitory appellate review.
Kerr involved a prisoner class action concerning the fairness of classifica-
tion decisions in the administration of California prisons. In pretrial discov-
ery the plaintiffs demanded access to prisoner records in order to compare
the treatment accorded various types of prisoners. 93 The defendant prison
officials, casting their objections in terms of irrelevance and official privilege,
objected that discovery would invade prisoner privacy and chill the develop-
ment of accurate information about individual prisoners.94 When the trial
court afforded discovery under a limited protective order, the prison officials
petitioned for mandamus from the court of appeals.95 The court of appeals
denied the petition on the ground that the claim of privilege was technically
imperfect, pretermitting consideration of whether the trial court's discovery
order may have gone too far.96
Speaking for the Court, Justice Marshall recited the standard restrictions
on obtaining appellate review by means of mandamus, particularly concern-
ing pretrial discovery:
The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in ex-
traordinary situations .... [T]he writ "has traditionally been used... only
'to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdic-
tion or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.' "
... [I]t is in the interest of the fair and prompt administration of justice
to discourage piecemeal litigation.
*. . [T]he party seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no other ade-
quate means to attain the relief he desires ... [and must] satisfy "the bur-
den of showing that [his] right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and
indisputable' "..... [I]ssuance of the writ is in large part a matter of discre-
tion with the court to which the petition is addressed. 97
As Justice Marshall then observed, "When looked at in the framework of
these factors, it would appear that the actions of the Court of Appeals in this
case should be affirmed." 98 That, it would seem, was that.
But Justice Marshall was cognizant of the serious consequences that the
prison officials anticipated from the broad discovery order as entered by the
district court and affirmed by the refusal of the court of appeals to grant
mandamus:
§ 1291 (1988) (appeal to court of appeals from final judgment in district court); 28 U.S.C. § 1292
(1988) (interlocutory appellate review by courts of appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988) (writs).
93. Kerr, 426 U.S. at 397-98.
94. Id. at 398.
95. Id. at 398-99.
96. Id. at 399-400.
97. Id. at 402-03 (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 404.
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Petitioners' claims of privilege rest in large part on the notion that turn-
ing over the requested documents would result in substantial injury to the
State's prison-parole system by unnecessarily chilling the free and uninhib-
ited exchange of ideas between staff members within the system, by causing
the unwarranted disclosure and consequent drying up of confidential
sources, and in general by unjustifiably compromising the confidentiality of
the system's records and personnel files. In light of the potential serious-
ness of these considerations and in light of the fact that the weight to be
accorded them will inevitably vary with the nature of the specific docu-
ments in question, it would seem that an in camera review of the docu-
ments is a relatively costless and eminently worthwhile method to insure
that the balance between petitioners' claims of irrelevance and privilege
and plaintiffs' asserted need for the documents is correctly struck.99
Anyone even casually familiar with prison administration would know
that these observations are gentle euphemisms. Prisoner personnel files con-
tain records of information supplied by prisoner "snitches." Disclosure of
such sources spreads like wildfire through the prisoner community, and the
consequence is often retribution against the snitch, including murder. Justice
Marshall, and no doubt other members of the Court, knew all of this from
having read certiorari petitions and perhaps other littgrature vgritg.
With these considerations in mind, Justice Marshall continued his discus-
sion of the denial of mandamus by the court of appeals:
Petitioners ask in essence only that the District Court review the chal-
lenged documents in camera before passing on whether each one individu-
ally should or should not be disclosed. But the Court of Appeals' opinion
. . . did not foreclose the possible necessity of such in camera review. Its
denial of the writ was based largely on the grounds that the governmental
privilege had not been asserted personally . . . with the requisite
specificity. ...
We are thus confident that the Court of Appeals did in fact intend to
afford the petitioners the opportunity to apply for and, upon proper appli-
cation, receive in camera review.l°°
Those who have studied Kerr, and those who have carefully tracked the
footnote references to the foregoing quotations from Justice Marshall's opin-
ion, will recognize that the sequence of rationales above does not correspond
to the sequence in the opinion itself. Rather, the sequence in the opinion is:
(1) mandamus is to be granted under only extraordinary circumstances, and
hence its denial is almost beyond reach of review in this court; (2) the court
of appeals opinion did not exclude the relief which its decision refused to
grant; (3) failing to grant that relief could have very serious consequences;
99. Id. at 405 (footnotes omitted).
100. Id. at 404, 406.
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and then (4) "We are thus confident that the Court of Appeals did in fact
intend to afford ... in camera review."'' 1
Framing the matter as did Justice Marshall makes it go down more gently:
The Supreme Court, while affirming the judgment of the court of appeals,
was admonishing that court that its decision was wrong. A certain delicacy
in decisional method, a subtlety in procedural contrivance is evident here.
VI. FURTHER REFLECTIONS
There are many other decisions by Justice Marshall that could be brought
forward for consideration. Some of them made conspicuous contributions to
the development of the law, for example, Shaffer v. Heitner, 102 which sought
to rationalize the law of territorial jurisdiction.° 3 Others faithfully gave ef-
fect to procedural principles in contexts where they might well disfavor polit-
ical and societal interests to which the Justice was sympathetic. At a time
when jury trials were thought to disfavor civil rights plaintiffs because of
racial prejudice on juries, Justice Marshall's opinion in Curtis v. Loether 104
held that the approach in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover10 5 strongly
favoring jury trial should be applied to an action under a civil rights stat-
ute.106 One could also call to mind some of his dissents. An example is that
in Colegrove v. Battin, 107 protesting the reduction of federal civil juries from
twelve to six. His dissent in the Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society 108 protested the Court's narrow interpretation of the powers of an
equity court to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff. By the count of
The Georgetown Law Journal, Justice Marshall was the author of over 100
opinions, most of them for the Court, dealing with questions of civil proce-
dure and federal jurisdiction. 109 Practically any one of these would be wor-
thy of comment in itself. Such a comprehensive examination, however,
might mistake the trees for the woods.
Much of the law, certainly the law of procedure, is not accurately ex-
pressed in broad general propositions, let alone in matters of "principle." On
the contrary, the law is a myriad of normative concretions: whatever the
101. Id. at 406.
102. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
103. But cf Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality) (Scalia, J.) (personal
jurisdiction satisfied by physical presence alone; no minimum contacts necessary).
104. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
105. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
106. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196 n.ll.
107. 413 U.S. 149, 187-88 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
109. Cecilia Kim, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Majority Opinions, Dissents, Concurrences, and
Second Circuit Opinions (unpublished compilation of opinions as of Oct., 1992) (on file with The
Georgetown Law Journal).
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"practical abilities and limitations of juries,"" 10 the fact remains that the jury
trial has been made a part of federal civil procedure by the Constitution it-
self. Although it is often fortuitous that process was served one day rather
than the day after,"I the fact remains that at the boundary a statute of limi-
tations is always arbitrary. Appellate review, especially by mandamus, is a
remedy to be sparingly used, even when the lower court has obviously made
a mistake." 2 A good judge has to know these things, and Justice Marshall
demonstrated in his life and work that he knew them well.
Moreover, the law's general propositions are transformed from word to act
in concrete cases. The business of the law-the reason for its existence-is
the decision of specific legal disputes, most of them relatively inconsequen-
tial. The disputes have to be decided with the legal resources at hand in a
particular historical moment: specific constitutional tradition; a specific sys-
tem of courts, in the American situation including more than fifty different
subsystems; a finite corps of judges, lawyers and participating litigants; and a
limited library of authoritative texts. A good judge has to know this, and
Justice Marshall demonstrated in his life and work that he did.13
The text of the law is only language. Surely this is true of the law of
procedure, which is the law's own language for defining, deliberating upon,
and determining its concrete cases. At some extension the law exhausts the
possibilities for refining its definitions. At that stage the judge must move
from reason to fiat-to an act and not merely to another word. A good judge
has to know that."14
Choice through act manifests itself by pointing or calling to mind prior
shared experience. For a Justice of the Supreme Court, the prior shared ex-
perience is what has happened in the world, and particularly in this country,
since the beginning, as understood in the Justice's lifetime-shared person
with person, day by day, case after case. Justice Marshall demonstrated in
his life and work that he knew that too.
There is a lawyer. There is a judge.
110. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
111. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
112. See Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
113. See, for example, the citation of Canada Malting in support of Gilbert against Van Dusen in
the Piper case, supra text accompanying note 62, or the graceful departure from Thermtron in the
Cohill case, supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
114. The decision in Walker Y. Armco Steel Co. is a small masterpiece in that art.
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